Seminario del Instituto de Economía

El 21 de julio a las 12 horas tendrá lugar el Seminario del Instituto de Economía. Será por Zoom: ID - 957 4591 5950 / Contraseña - 4k?7YQk2U4. Los Seminario de Investigación del Instituto de Economía tienen una frecuencia semanal. En ellos se presentan avances de investigación o trabajos en curso sobre diversos tópicos disciplinares.

Presentará Juan Dubra (Universidad de Montevideo) en co-autoría con J.P. Benoit & G. Romagnoli.
"Belief Elicitation When More Than Money Matters: Controlling for "Control""

Resumen
"Incentive compatible mechanisms for eliciting beliefs typically presume that the utility of money is state independent, or that money is the only argument in utility functions. However, subjects may have non-monetary objectives that confound the mechanisms. In particular, psychologists have argued that people favour bets where their ability is involved over equivalent random bets -a so-called preference for control. We propose a new belief elicitation method that mitigates the control preference. Using this method, we determine that under the ostensibly incentive compatible matching probabilities method, our subjects report self-beliefs 18% higher than their true beliefs in order to increase control. Non-monetary objectives account for at least 68% of what would normally be measured as overconfidence. Our mechanism can be used to yield better measurements of beliefs in contexts beyond the study of overconfidence. Our paper also contributes to a refined understanding of control. We f ind that control manifests itself only as a desire for betting on doing well; betting on doing badly is perceived as a negative".

Sobre el investigador.

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