El jueves 11 de noviembre a las 13 horas tendrá lugar un Seminario de Investigación del GIDE Properties of contests: Constructing contest success functions from best-responses a cargo del profesor Ph.D. Luis Corchón (Departamento de Economía - Universidad Carlos III de Madrid).
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Abstract
We aim at characterizing which kind of functions could be explained (rationalized) as the best reply of payoff-maximizing agents in contests for a fixed prize. We show that the rationalizability strongly differs between Decisive Contests, where the prize is allocated with certainty, and Possibly Indecisive Contests, where the prize may not be awarded. In the latter, any arbitrary set of best reply functions is rationalizable, thus “anything goes.” In the former, best reply functions have to satisfy strong conditions in two-person contests. But with more than two contestants, we have a partial result showing that anything goes as well. We end the paper with an outline of possible applications of our results to R&D and labor markets.
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